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THE NEW FEDERAL LABOR LAWt
by
Lennart V. Larson*
D URING the past several years there has been mounting senti-
ment for new labor legislation and changes in the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947 (popularly known as the Taft-Hart-
ley Act).' Early in 1957 the Senate Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor or Management Field was appointed with
Senator John McClellan as Chairman. The hearings and disclosures
of the Committee over a two-and-a-half year period played a major
part in causing Congress to enact what is accurately described as far-
reaching labor reform legislation.
The contest in Congress was whether the reform legislation should
be "mild" or "drastic." In June, 1958, a mild reform law, the Ken-
nedy-Ives bill, was passed by the Senate but was rejected in the House
of Representatives. In April, 1959, the Senate Labor Committee re-
ported out the Kennedy-Ervin bill, a moderate reform law. The bill
was passed in the Senate, but not before amendments were made, in-
cluding the tacking on of a bill of rights for union members.
Meanwhile, the House Labor Committee had not been idle. On
July 30, 1959, it reported out a bill. On the House floor three bills
came up for choice: the Committee's bill (Elliott bill), the Shelly bill,
and the Landrum-Grifin bill. President Eisenhower in a public ad-
dress of August 6 gave his weighty support to the Landrum-Griffin
bill. The Shelly bill, supported by labor, was rejected, and on August
13 the House adopted the Landrum-Griffin bill. Subsequently, the
House-Senate Conference Committee met and reached agreement on
September 2. The conference bill was approved by the Senate the next
day and by the House on September 4. President Eisenhower signed
the bill on September 14.'
The new act is called the "Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959."' In important respects it follows the bill ap-
proved by the House and hence is popularly referred to as the "Lan-
drum-Griffin Act." The new law has seven titles, the first six of
t This article is an extension of a paper presented at the Southwestern Legal Foundation
Institute on Labor Law (1959).
* B.S., J.D., University of Washington; S.J.D., University of Michigan; Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
'61 Stat. 136, amended, P.L. No. 129, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), 29 U.S.C. 5 141.
The act consisted of five titles, the first of which amended the National Labor Relations
Act (popularly known as the Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
'A brief history of the legislation is set forth in 44 L.R.R.M. 54 (1959).
3P.L. 86-257, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 73 Stat. $19.
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which became effective immediately. The seventh title contains
amendments of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The amendments be-
came effective on November 13, 60 days after approval of the act
by the President.
I. AMENDMENTS TO THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
A. Elimination of No-Man's Land
Three 1957 decisions of the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished that if the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had ju-
risdiction over a case involving unfair labor practices or activities
protected by the Taft-Hartley Act but declined to exercise its juris-
diction, a state court or agency was precluded from dealing with the
case, unless tort liability arose out of violence or trespass.4 Thus, a
no-man's land was created-a realm of businesses and industry in or
affecting interstate commerce where the procedures of the Taft-
Hartley Act were unavailable and state remedies could not be ap-
plied. Under the new act the no-man's land has been put under state
authority if the NLRB declines to exercise its jurisdiction.
Section 701 (a) of the new act adds subsection (c) to section 14
of the NLRA. The subsection permits the NLRB, "by rule of deci-
sion or by published rules," to "decline to assert jurisdiction over
any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers,
where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute
on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of
its jurisdiction." But the Board may not decline to assert jurisdiction
in any case wherein it would have asserted jurisdiction under stand-
ards prevailing on August 1, 1959. With respect to cases over which
the Board declines to assert its jurisdiction, state and territorial agen-
cies and courts may assume jurisdiction. It seems clear that the agen-
cies and courts are free to apply local law.
A question arises as to what the NLRB's jurisdictional standards
were on August 1, 1959. On October 2, 1958, the Board published
standards which were a revision of earlier standards issued on July
15, 1954.' These latest standards, along with pertinent decisions be-
tween October 2, 1958, and August 1, 1959, would seem to consti-
tute the jurisdiction within which the Board must exercise its powers.
'Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
353 U.S. 26 (1957); all discussed in Larson, Current Labor Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, 11 Sw. L.J. 322 (1957).
*42 L.R.R.M. 96 (1958).
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Undoubtedly it will happen that a party to state proceedings will
claim that the case is one over which the NLRB must take jurisdic-
tion. If the ruling is against the party, must he suffer the state pro-
ceedings to run their course and then appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court? Or is there an easier way to secure a determination
whether or not the case is one within the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Board? In recent months the NLRB has been studying the matter
of issuing jurisdictional guidelines. New rules and regulations have
been promulgated under which a person or a state agency may se-
cure an advisory opinion as to whether the Board would exercise
jurisdiction over the parties to a particular controversy.! Perhaps in
doubtful cases state courts and agencies will require clearance (i.e.,
an advisory opinion) from the NLRB before assuming jurisdiction
and applying local law.
Notice should be taken that the proviso to section 10 (a) of the
NLRA remains undisturbed.' A negative implication from the pro-
viso was the basis for the no-man's land decisions of 1957.' The pro-
viso governs formal cessions of jurisdiction by the NLRB, allowing
them only if state or territorial law is consistent with federal law.
The proviso seems to be a dead letter with respect to cases over which
the Board declines to exercise jurisdiction under section 14(c). Per-
haps the proviso has operation with respect to cases over which the
Board cannot decline to take jurisdiction under section 14 (c).
B. Representation Proceedings Before Regional Directors
Section 701 (b) of the new act amends section 3 (b) of the NLRA.
The Board is now authorized to delegate to the regional directors its
power to hear and decide representation questions.! It should be not-
ed that review of the regional directors' orders may be had, and it
is clear that the Board has the final say. However, the action of
a regional director is not stayed pending review unless specifically
so ordered by the Board. It is thought that delegation of the Board's
powers in petition proceedings will lessen the tremendous case load
in Washington.
'NLRB Rules and Regulations, Series 8, Nov. 13, 1959, Part 102, Subpart H.
The proviso empowers the Board to cede to a state or territorial agency jurisdiction
"over any cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and
transportation except where predominantly local in character)" if the local law governing
the agency is consistent with the NLRA.
See cases cited note 4 supra.
The Board may delegate "its powers under section 9 to determine the unit appropriate
for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and deter-
mine whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a secret
ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 9 and certify the results thereof .. "
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C. Right of Economic Strikers to Vote in Representation Elections
Since the early days of the Wagner Act and up to the present time
the NLRB has divided strikes into two classes. An unfair labor prac-
tice strike is one provoked or prolonged by an unfair labor practice.
All other strikes are economic. Unfair labor practice strikers are en-
titled to reinstatement to their jobs and are entitled to vote in elec-
tions conducted by the Board. Economic strikers, on the other hand,
take the chance that their jobs will be filled by permanent replace-
ments and that they will not be able to negotiate a return to em-
ployment. If an economic striker's job is filled by a permanent re-
placement, he has no right to reinstatement to the job when the strike
ends. If the job is not filled by a permanent replacement, in general
he has a right to reinstatement on abandoning the strike."
Initially, under the Wagner Act, the NLRB allowed economic
strikers to vote in representation elections, but not their replace-
ments.1 Later, both the strikers and their permanent replacements
were allowed to vote." The Taft-Hartley Act extended voting rights
only to those employees who had a right to reinstatement." In other
words, economic strikers who were permanently replaced were not
permitted to vote in NLRB elections. Section 702 of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 changes this by
amending the second sentence of section 9(c) (a) of the NLRA.
Now economic strikers who have been permanently replaced are eli-
gible to vote "in any election conducted within twelve months after
the commencement of the strike."
Eligibility to vote is subject to "such regulations as the Board
shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this Act."
Before the new act was passed, the employee relation of some econo-
mic strikers could be terminated regardless of whether they had been
permanently replaced. The commission of serious acts of violence or
trespass, striking in violation of a collective bargaining contract,
and striking in the face of a specific statutory prohibition, have been
deemed sufficient causes for discharge. Commission of an unfair labor
practice may in some situations be cause for discharge. Undoubtedly
the NLRB will develop new doctrine, as well as confirm old, that
" Rules governing the reinstatement rights of economic and unfair labor practice strik-
ers are discussed in Forkosch, Labor Law § 269 (1953). See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel.
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
" A. Sartorius & Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 493 (1938).
"Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 163 (1941). See address of James V. Constantine,
Solicitor for the NLRB, reported in 45 Lab. Rel. Rep. 231 (January 11, 1960).
"3Section 9(c) (3), second sentence: "Employees on strike who are not entitled to rein-
statement shall not be eligible to vote."
[ Vol. 14
THE NEW FEDERAL LABOR LAW
particular activities of economic strikers are inconsistent with the
purposes and provisions of the NLRA and result in loss of eligibility
to vote.
D. "Hot Cargo" Clauses
Section 704 of the new act makes important changes in the law
governing secondary boycotts, prohibits agreements for "hot cargo"
clauses, and bans organizational picketing in defined situations. It is
convenient first to speak of section 704(b).
There has been uncertainty as to whether an agreement between
an employer and a union that employees will not be required to han-
dle or work on goods coming from an "unfair" employer is legal un-
der section 8 (b) (4) of the NLRA. Local 1976 v. NLRB"4 held that
the agreement of itself was not illegal and that an employer might
comply with it. But union inducement of the employees not to work
on or handle the goods was held to be an unfair labor practice. The
union was not permitted to force the employer to abide by his agree-
ment by inducing the employees to strike or to refuse to work on
or handle the "unfair" goods.
Section 704(b) adds a subsection (e) to section 8 of the NLRA
and makes a new determination concerning the legality of "hot car-
go" clauses. An unfair labor practice is committed by both parties
where an employer and a union enter into contract, express or im-
plied, "whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or
refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise deal-
ing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing
business with any other person." It follows that a union may not
make demand for such an agreement in collective bargaining, and
striking and picketing to gain it is made an unfair labor practice
under section 8 (b) (4) (A), as newly amended. The query has been
raised whether section 8 (e) makes illegal a provision often found in
collective bargaining contracts restricting the employer's right to sub-
contract out work. The purpose of the anti-subcontracting provision
is to preserve the integrity of the bargaining unit and the employ-
ment opportunities of the men within the employer's plant. It is not
ordinarily agreed to for the purpose of putting economic pressure on
third parties with whom the union has disputes. Doubt is expressed
that the anti-subcontracting provision falls within the intent or let-
ter of section 8 (e).
A proviso states that nothing in section 8 (e) "shall apply to an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the con-
14357 U.S. 93 (1958).
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struction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of
work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting,
or repair of a building, structure, or other work." Stated more sim-
ply, the proviso permits an employer in the construction industry to
agree with a union not to enter into contract with a subcontractor
who does not maintain union standards. Argument has arisen whether
it is lawful for an employer and a union to agree that fabrication of
certain parts should be done at the construction site and not before.
Senator Pat McNamara has expressed himself that the Senate and
House conferees intended that the exemption of the proviso should
extend to all work that can be performed at a construction site. Con-
gressman Carroll D. Kearns has expressed a contrary view.'
A second proviso makes the prohibition of section 8 (e) inapplica-
ble to the apparel and clothing industry." The proviso has a compli-
cated form, and a greater exemption is created than is allowed to the
construction industry. This is immediately apparent when it is noted
that the exemption extends to the prohibition of section 8 (b) (4) (B)
(dealing with secondary boycotts).
E. Secondary Boycotts
Section 8 (b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act was difficult to under-
stand, and the amendments of the new act do not make the section
less of a problem in syntax and sentence diagramming. Perhaps the
best procedure is to paraphrase and simplify and to compare the old
and new sections. The old section made it an unfair labor practice
for a union to engage in, or to induce "the employees of any em-
ployer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal" to use, handle
or work on goods or to perform any services in order to gain any of
several enumerated objects. Paragraph (A) included two objects:
(1) forcing an employer or self-employed person to join a union or
an employer organization; and (2) forcing "any employer or other
person" to cease using, selling, handling or dealing in the products
of any other producer "or to cease doing business with any other
person." The language defining the latter object effectuated a broad
prohibition of secondary boycotts. Paragraph (B) defined the ob-
ject of forcing "any other employer" to recognize or bargain with
a union unless it had been certified by the NLRB as the collective
"SSee statements in 44 L.R.R.M. 55 (1959).
"The constitutionality of section 8 (e) has been attacked on the ground that the pro-
visos make the section discriminatory. The argument was rejected, the court saying that
Congress could reasonably conclude that special problems in the construction and apparel
and clothing industries made exceptions desirable. Brown v. Local No. 17, Amalgamated
Lithographers of America, 45 L.R.R.M. 2577 (N.D. Calif. 1960).
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bargaining agent of the employees. By implication secondary boycott
to compel the other employer to recognize and bargain with a cer-
tified union was lawful. Paragraph (C) defined the object of forcing
an employer to recognize or bargain with a particular union if another
union had been certified by the NLRB. Paragraph (D) defined the
object of forcing an employer to assign particular work to employees
in a particular union or craft rather than to employees in another
union or craft, unless the employer was failing to conform to a Board
order or certification designating the bargaining representative. Both
paragraphs (C) and (D) contemplated primary strike situations.
A proviso to the whole of section 8 (b) (4) stated that nothing in
subsection (b) should be construed to make unlawful a refusal by
an employee to enter the premises of an employer (not his own) if
the employees of such employer were on strike approved by a collec-
tive bargaining representative whom the employer was required to
recognize.
The new section 8 (b) (4) retains the exact language of old para-
graphs (B), (C), and (D) and the proviso. It also retains in para-
graph (A) the same language with respect to forcing an employer
or self-employed person to join a union or employee organization.
Added to the same paragraph is the object of forcing an employer
or self-employed person to enter into a "hot cargo" agreement.
The second object in the old paragraph (A) has been moved to the
first part of paragraph (B) and has been reworded in important
respects. The paragraph preceding the enumeration of objects has
also been reworded in significant respects.
Limiting attention to the changes in section 8 (b) (4) bearing on
secondary boycotts, one finds that it is now an unfair labor practice
for a union (i) to engage in, or to induce "any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employ-
ment" to use, handle or work on any goods or perform any services
"or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce" in order to gain any
of the defined objects in paragraphs (A) through (D). Paragraph
(B) defines the object of forcing "any person to cease using . . .
handling.., or dealing in the products" of any other producer or "to
cease doing business with any other person." A proviso declares that
nothing in the paragraph "shall be construed to make unlawful,
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picket-
ing." A proviso at the end of section 8 (b) (4) states:
1960]
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.. . That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing con-
tained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity,
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public,
including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a pro-
duct or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor
organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another em-
ployer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing
any individual employed by any person other than the primary em-
ployer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or
transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establish-
ment of the employer engaged in such distribution ... "
The prohibition of secondary boycotts in section 8 (b) (4) has
been tightened up in several ways."s Reference to the italicized
words and expressions will show how this has been done. First, under
the old act an unfair labor practice was not established unless two
or more employees were induced to engage in a strike or concerted
refusal to use, handle, or work on goods or to perform services.
Now inducement of a single individual is enough to constitute an
unfair labor practice.
Second, under the old act an unfair labor practice was not estab-
lished unless "employees" of an "employer," as those words were
defined in the statute, were induced to strike or engage in a concerted
refusal to work on or handle goods. Now it is sufficient to show
inducement of "any individual employed by any person engaged
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce." The word,
"person," includes employers outside the definition in section 2 (2)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, such as railroads, governmental units
and municipalities. The word, "individual," includes employees out-
side the definition in section 2 (3), such as supervisors and agricultural
workers, not to mention employees of employers falling outside the
definition in section 2 (2).
Third, the old act said nothing about direct threats of violence
or trespass applied to a secondary employer, or about coercion by
methods not involving inducements to strike or to refuse to use,
handle or work on goods. Now it is an unfair labor practice "to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce." Certainly this language covers
violence, trespass and threats thereof. Under the Taft-Hartley Act
there was indication that picketing to cause consumers to cease
patronizing was not an unfair labor practice because it did not in-
17 All italics in this paragraph are supplied by the writer.
"s See address by Stuart Rothman, General Counsel for the NLRB, in 45 Lab. Rel. Rep.
390 (Feb. 22, 1960).
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duce employees to strike or to refuse to use, handle or work on
goods."9 Under the new act it seems likely that such picketing is
coercion and restraint within the language of section 8 (b) (4) (ii).
Support for this interpretation is to be found in the final proviso
which states that nothing in section 8 (b) (4) "shall be construed to
prohibit publicity, other than picketing."
2
M
The proviso just referred to may be depended upon to give rise
to much litigation. Publicity other than picketing is allowed for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers)
that a neutral is selling or distributing products produced by an
employer with whom the union has a (primary) dispute. But the
publicity is not allowed if it has the effect of inducing any individual
employed by a person other than the primary employer to refuse
to handle or transport goods or to perform services at the neutral's
place of business.
Building and construction unions hoped to secure an exception to
the ban on secondary boycotts where a union strikes and pickets
a construction site because a subcontractor fails to meet union stand-
ards. No such exception was made in the new law, however, and
the doctrine of NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades
Council,"' United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB,"5 and In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB 3 still stands.
Under this doctrine a general contractor may contract with a sub-
contractor who does not comply with union standards, and if a union
pickets or calls a strike of employees of other subcontractors, section
8 (b) (4) (B) is violated. The view has been expressed that the
striking and picketing is really primary, since a union representing
all the employees in an industrial plant has an undoubted right to
strike and picket for the improvement of conditions of a part of
the employees. President Eisenhower and Secretary of Labor James
Mitchell have voiced the opinion that an exception should be made
in favor of building and construction trade unions. At the present
time the House Labor Committee is conducting hearings on the
matter.4
Since the prohibition of "hot cargo" agreements does not apply to
the construction industry, may a union strike and picket to gain
such an agreement? NLRB General Counsel Stuart Rothman has
'9NLRB v. Local 366, Brewery Workers, 272 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1959).
2' Emphasis added. See address by Stuart Rothman, supra note 18.
21 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
22341 U.S. 707 (1951).
23341 U.S. 694 (1951).
2445 Lab. Rel. Rep. 383 (Feb. 22, 1960).
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indicated a negative answer." However, one may argue that if a
construction union may bargain for agreement that the general
contractor will not deal with non-union subcontractors, it should
have the right to use traditional peaceable means (striking, picket-
ing) to cause the general contractor to yield. A distinction can be
drawn between striking and picketing to gain such an agreement
and striking and picketing to cause a neutral, not bound by a pre-
vious agreement, not to deal with the primary employer disputant.
Comment has been made concerning the exemption granted in the
apparel and clothing industry with respect to "hot cargo" agree-
ments. The exemption is stated in terms of a relationship and is more
intelligible after section 8 (b) (4) (B) is studied. For the purposes
of sections 8 (e) and 8 (b) (4) (B) "the terms 'any employer', 'any
person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce', and
'any person' when used in relation to the terms 'any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer', 'any other employer', or 'any other
person' shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manu-
facturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or
premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an
integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing in-
dustry." Since the ban of secondary boycotts in section 8 (b) (4) (B)
does not apply to persons in the indicated relationships in the apparel
and clothing industry, it would seem that striking and picketing
may be carried on to secure a "hot cargo" agreement. The difference
in treatment of the apparel and clothing industry in the second pro-
viso to section 8 (e) may be basis for saying that unions in the con-
struction and building industry (dealt with in the first proviso)
may not strike and picket for a "hot cargo" agreement.
Brief notice should be taken of section 704 (e) of the new act,
which simplifies section 303 (a) of the LMRA, 1947. The purpose
of the whole of section 303 is to create a cause of action for damages
in favor of a person injured in his business or property because of
the commission of unfair labor practices described in section 8 (b)
(4). Section 303 (a) formerly set out all the activities described in
section 8 (b) (4). Now section 303 (a) merely says that it is unlawful
for a union "to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an
unfair labor practice in section 8 (b) (4)."
F. Recognition Picketing
Section 704 (c) of the new act adds a new paragraph (7) to sec-
tion 8 (b) of the NLRA and creates a new unfair labor practice on
"1See 45 Lab. Rel. Rep. 78 (Nov. 23, 1959).
[ Vol. 14
THE NEW FEDERAL LABOR LAW
the part of unions. Three situations are set out in which it is an
unfair labor practice to picket or to threaten or cause picketing
where the object is (1) to force an employer to recognize or bargain
with a union as the representative of his employees, or (2) to force
his employees to accept or select the union as their collective bar-
gaining representative:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with
this Act any other labor organization and a question concern-
ing representation may not appropriately be raised under sec-
tion 9 (c) of this Act,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election un-
der section 9 (c) of this Act has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
under section 9 (c) being filed within a reasonable period of
time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of
such picketing....
An unfair labor practice is not made out in these situations, however,
if the picketing union "is currently certified as the representative
of... [the] employees."
Situation (A) has a number of variations. An employer may have
had contractual relations with a union for several years, and he en-
ters into a new contract, believing that the union continues to rep-
resent the majority of his employees. Or their previous contract may
be automatically renewed through failure to give notice to amend
or terminate. Or the employer and the union may enter into a new
contract during the 60-day "insulated period" at the end of their
old contract when no rival union is permitted to file a representa-
tion petition." Or the employer may enter into a first contract with
a union in good faith without committing an unfair labor practice,
being convinced that the union represents his employees. In all these
instances a question concerning representation cannot appropriately
be raised for the life of the contract (not exceeding two years'),
and a rival union may not picket and demand collective bargaining
privileges.
Situation (B) has variations, but the controlling fact is that an
NLRB election has been held within twelve months preceding the
picketing. Another union may have won or lost that election, or
the picketing union may have lost it. In any event the picketing
is an unfair labor practice." If another union won the election,
2 Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958); Appalachian Shale Products
Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958).
27 Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990 (1958).
2" Temporary injunctions have issued in Consentino v. Local 344, Retail Clerks, 45
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whether or not it has been recognized or has a contract seems im-
material.
It is to be noticed that section 8 (b) (7) (A) and (B) complement
section 8 (b) (4) (C). Under the latter section striking and refusal
to work to force an employer to recognize or bargain with one
union when another has been certified as the collective bargaining
agent for the employees is an unfair labor practice. Under section
8 (b) (7) (A) and (B) picketing for this purpose is an unfair labor
practice.
Situation (C) in section 8 (b) (7) covers cases in which no NLRB
election has been held within twelve months and a question con-
cerning representation can appropriately be raised. An unfair labor
practice is committed if a petition under section 9 (c) is not filed
by the picketing union "within a reasonable time not to exceed
thirty days from the commencement of . . . [the] picketing." A
proviso states that "when such a petition has been filed the Board
shall forthwith without regard to the provisions of section 9 (c) (1)
or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of
the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board
finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof."
The proviso affords a speedy procedure for resolving a representa-
tion case where picketing is initiated and the picketing union files a
petition within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days. Until
the procedure eventuates in an election which the union loses, the
picketing is lawful. A danger exists that unions (and employers)
may deliberately cause picketing to be instituted in order to gain the
advantages of the expedited procedure. The NLRB has anticipated
this possibility, and its new rules and regulations make the proced-
ure available only if a charge of violation of section 8 (b) (7) (C)
has been filed. 9 If the election petition is filed more than a reasonable
time (or more than thirty days) after the picketing is commenced,
the expedited procedure is not available. The picketing union is guilty
of unfair labor practice, and the language of the proviso ("such a
petition") limits the availability of the procedure to petitions which
have been filed within the prescribed time.
A second proviso to section 8 (b) (7) (C) states:
• . . That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to
prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not
L.R.R.M. 2660 (S.D. I11. 1959); Elliott v. Dallas Gen. Drivers, 45 L.R.R.M. 2428 (N.D.
Tex. 1959). In both cases the picketing union lost the earlier election.
"Part 102, Subpart D, Sections 102.75 - 102.77. See address by Stuart Rothman, Gen-
[ Vol. 14
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employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, un-
less an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed
by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up,
deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services.
It is to be noticed that this proviso, as well as the first, qualifies sub-
paragraph (C) of section 8 (b) (7) and not subparagraphs (A) and
(B). Hence it may be asserted that the prohibitions of picketing in
(A) and (B) are absolute." It is also to be noticed that the proviso
permits "picketing." This is in contrast to the second proviso to sec-
tion 8 (b) (4), which permits "publicity, other than picketing."
The second proviso to section 8 (b) (7) (C) permits "picketing or
other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public
(including consumers) that an employer does not employ members
of, or have a contract with, a labor organization." But such picketing
is not allowed if it has a boycott effect on the part of other employ-
ees, i.e., if it induces "any individual employed by any other person
... not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform
any services."31 Three cases in the federal district courts have held
that the proviso does not grant any immunity if a purpose of the
picketing is to gain collective bargaining rights or to require the em-
ployees to accept the picketing union as their bargaining representa-
tive. Even though the picketing is informational,
. . . this is irrelevant if such picketing has as one of its objectives
an unfair labor practice. . . . Neither the proviso in §8 (b) (7) (C),
the First Amendment to the Constitution, nor the authorities cited
justify non-coercive speech or picketing in furtherance of an unlaw-
ful objective as described in the Act as amended. Congress did not
intend by the general language in the proviso in §8 (b) (7) (C) to
sanction that which it so expressly outlawed in the specific language
immediately preceding the proviso.33
The picketing is unlawful "whether or not the effect of such picket-
ing is to induce any individual employed by any other person not to
pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any serv-
ices.'" One case is to the contrary, holding that the picketing is un-
lawful only if it has boycott effects on the part of other employees."
eral Counsel of the NLRB, 45 Lab. Rel. Rep. 69, 72, 73 (Nov. 23, 1959).
"0 To the contrary is an NLRB intermediate report discussed in 45 Lab. Rel. Rep. 366
(Feb. 15, 1960).
" Greene v. Typographical Union, 45 L.R.R.M. 2470 (D.C. Conn. 1960).
"
2 McLeod v. Local 239, International Bhd. of Teamsters, 179 F. Supp. 481 (E.D.N.Y.
1960); Elliott v. Sapulpa Typographical Union, 45 L.R.R.M. 2400 (N.D.Okla. 1959);
Phillips v. Garment Workers Union, 45 L.R.R.M. 2363 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
' McLeod v. Local 239, International Bhd. of Teamsters, supra note 32, at 487.
'Elliott v. Sapulpa Typographical Union, 45 L.R.R.M. 2400, at 2403 (N.D. Okla.
1959).
" Getrew v. Bartenders Union, 42 L.R.R.M. 2496 (N.D.Ind. 1960).
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What Congress intended is a difficult problem to solve. On the one
hand it may be argued that the prohibition of picketing in subpara-
graph (C) would be virtually nullified if the second proviso is inter-
preted as permitting picketing where collective bargaining rights are
sought. The specification of the "purpose of truthfully advising the
public ... that an employer does not employ members of, or have
a contract with, a labor organization" may imply that the purpose
of securing collective bargaining rights renders the picketing unlaw-
ful. On the other hand, it may be argued that the latter purpose is
inextricably tied up with the purposes specified in the proviso. If this
is true, then the proviso permits picketing even though a purpose is
to secure collective bargaining rights, so long as the picketing does
not have boycott effects on the part of employees of third parties.
A principal question raised by the whole of section 8 (b) (7) is its
impact on NLRB doctrine that peaceful picketing by a minority
union is an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b) (1) (A)." In
Curtis Bros." and Alloy Mfg. Co." it was held that once it is
established by election that a union is in the minority, picketing
thereafter for collective bargaining rights is an unfair labor prac-
tice." The reason is that the picketing puts constraint on the em-
ployees to choose the union as their collective bargaining representa-
tive. The employer may also be constrained to cause his employees to
accept the union.
It would appear that section 8 (b) (7) now supersedes the Curtis
doctrine. Section 8 (b) (7) is a comprehensive regulation of picket-
ing by minority unions and must be resorted to in the situations de-
scribed. However, the last sentence of the section states that "nothing
in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which
would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8 (b)."
This may save such parts of the Curtis doctrine as are not dealt with
specifically in section 8 (b) (7). It is possible that the sentence will
prevent the second proviso to subparagraph (C) from operating
fully according to its terms. Indeed, the sentence may swing the bal-
ance in the ultimate determination whether the proviso operates
3 "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents - (1) to
restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7 ......
Section 7 declares the right of employees to engage in concerted activities and to bargain
collectively and "to refrain from any or all of such activities."
" Drivers, Chauffers, & Helpers Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters & Curtis Bros., 119
N.L.R.B. 232 (1957).
" International Ass'n of Machinists & Alloy Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 307 (1957).
" Later cases are Valley Knitting Mills, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1960); Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 126 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1960); Aetna Plywood & Veneer Co., 126
N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1960).
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where a purpose of the picketing is to gain collective bargaining
rights. Under the Curtis decision such picketing is an unfair labor
practice where a minority union is concerned, and the proviso may
well be interpreted consistent with this doctrine.
G. Pre-Hire Contracts
Section 705 of the new law adds a subsection (f) to section 8 of
the NLRA which is applicable only in the building and construction
industry. Declaration is made that no unfair labor practice is com-
mitted where an employer "engaged primarily in the building and
construction industry" enters into contract with a union "covering
employees engaged (or who, upon employment will be engaged) in
the building and construction industry" even though
(1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been
established under the provisions of section 9 of this Act prior to the
making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a condi-
tion of employment, membership in such labor organization after the
seventh day following the beginning of such employment or the effec-
tive date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement
requires the employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities
for employment with such employer, or gives such labor organization
an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such employment, or
(4) such agreement specifies minimum training or experience qualifi-
cations for employment or provides for priority in opportunities for
employment based upon length of service with such employer, in the
industry or in the particular geographical area. ...
Of course, the union may not be "established, maintained, or assisted
by any action defined in section 8 (a) ... as an unfair labor practice."
Section 8 (f) was enacted on representations that special conditions
in the building and construction industry justified the authorization
of pre-hire agreements. The authorization goes a long way. The union
need not have been established as the majority representative of the
employees. A union shop provision may be included requiring em-
ployees to become union members after seven days. However, section
705 (b) of the new act saves the operation of state "right-to-work"
laws. Nothing in section 8 (f) is to be construed as authorizing the
execution of union shop agreements in a state or territory prohibiting
them.
The third clause in section 8 (f) permits contract terms requiring
the employer to notify the union of employment opportunities or
giving the union an opportunity to refer qualified applicants. Specu-
lation has been indulged as to whether the clause modifies the doc-
trine of Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated General Con-
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tractors, Inc.4" In this case the exclusive union hiring hall was held
an unfair labor practice under section 8 (a) (3)."' But criteria were
set up for a valid union hiring hall agreement. First, the selection of
applicants for referral had to be independent of conditions based on
union policies, charter or by-laws. There could be no discrimination
against non-union applicants. Second, the employer must have the
right to reject applicants referred by the union. Third, notices had
to be posted at the hiring hall informing applicants how to obtain
referrals and stating that union membership was not necessary for
referrals. It is not clear that the third clause of section 8 (f) authoriz-
es more or less than is allowed under the Mountain Pacific doctrine.
The clause does not seem inconsistent with the doctrine, and the case
probably stands as authority with respect to hiring hall arrangements.
The fourth clause of section 8 (f) permits agreements recognizing
priority rights to employment based on training and experience or
on length of service with the employer, in the industry or in the par-
ticular geographical area. Advantages will accrue to unions in nego-
tiating such agreements, since their memberships usually include a
considerable proportion of men with substantial training, experience,
and length of service.
A proviso to section 8 (f) states that any pre-hire agreement
"which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall
not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 9 (c) or 9 (e)."
This means that after a building and construction employer hires
his work force, the employees are free at any time to file a petition
for determination of their collective bargaining representative or for
decertification. Further, they can petition for an election withdraw-
ing from the union its authorization to enter into a union shop con-
tract.
The question has been raised whether a union may strike and picket
against a building and construction employer in order to gain a pre-
hire agreement. As in the case of "hot cargo" agreements, one may
argue that if a union may negotiate for an agreement it may use tra-
ditional peaceful means to cause the employer to yield. A serious com-
plication, however, is that if the union is not established as a majority
representative (and usually it will not be), its picketing violates the
terms of section 8 (b) (7) (C). The situation is one where the ulti-
40 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957). See address by NLRB Member Joseph A. Jenkins on June
3, 1959, reported in 44 L.R.R.M. 71 (1959).
41 ,It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (3) by discrimination in re-
gard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization . .. ."
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mate holding may well be that agreement is legal but that picketing
to achieve it is an unfair labor practice."
II. THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOsuRE ACT OF 1959
The caption of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 states that it is an act "to provide for the reporting and
disclosure of certain financial transactions and administrative prac-
tices of labor organizations and employers, to prevent abuses in the
administration of trusteeships by labor organizations, to provide
standards with respect to the election of officers of labor organiza-
tions, and for other purposes." Section 2 contains a declaration of
findings, purposes, and policy. Recital is made that "it continues to
be the responsibility of the Federal Government to protect employ-
ees' rights to organize, choose their own representatives, bargain col-
lectively, and otherwise engage in concerted activities. . . ." In order
"to accomplish the objective of a free flow of commerce it is essential
that labor organizations, employers, and their officials adhere to the
highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administer-
ing the affairs of their organizations, particularly as they affect labor-
management relations." Finding is made on the basis of recent in-
vestigations "that there have been a number of instances of breach
of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees,
and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and
ethical conduct" in the area of labor relations and within labor or-
ganizations. The conclusion is that enactment of the new law "is
necessary to eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part of
labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their
officers and representatives which distort or defeat the policies" of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, and the Railway Labor
Act.43
Section 3 sets forth a dozen definitions. These have application in
Titles I through VI (except in section 505).
A. Title I: Bill of Rights for Union Members
Under section 101 (a) (1) all members of a labor organization have
equal rights and privileges "to nominate candidates, to vote in elec-
tions or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership
' See address of Saul Jaffe, Associate Solicitor of the NLRB, reported in 45 L.R.R.M.
224 (Jan. 11, 1960).
4344 Stat. 577 (1926), amended, 48 Stat. 926, 1185 (1934), 49 Stat. 1921 (1936), 54
Stat. 785 (1940), 64 Stat. 1238 (1951).
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meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the
business of such meetings."" But these rights and privileges are "sub-
ject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's con-
stitution and bylaws."
Section 101 (a) (2) lists other rights of union members: "to meet
and assemble freely with other members"; "to express any views,
arguments, or opinions"; and to express at union meetings their views
upon candidates in an election or upon any business properly before
the meetings."' These rights are subject to the union's established and
reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings. Further, the
union has a right "to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the
responsibility of every member toward the . . . [union] as an institu-
tion and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with
its performance of its legal or contractual duties."
Section 101(a) (3) limits the power of unions to raise dues and
initiation fees and to levy general or special assessments. In the case
of local unions such action can be taken only after "majority vote
by secret ballot of the members in good standing voting at a gen-
eral or special membership meeting," and reasonable notice of inten-
tion to vote on the question must be given. Or the vote may be by
membership referendum conducted by secret ballot. Section
101 (a) (3) has no application to a federation of national or interna-
tional labor organizations. In the case of a labor organization other
than a local union or a federation of national or international unions,
dues and initiation fees may be raised and general and special assess-
ments may be levied only (1) after a majority vote of delegates at-
tending a regular convention or a special convention called on at
least 30 days' written notice, or (2) after majority vote of the mem-
bers voting in a membership referendum conducted by secret ballot,
or (3) after majority vote by "members of the executive board or
similar governing body" of the organization, "pursuant to express
authority contained in the constitution and bylaws of such labor or-
ganization." But the action of the executive or governing board is
effective only until the next regular convention of the labor organi-
zation.
Section 101 (a) (4) forbids a union from limiting the right of any
" The right of a member to secure injunction to compel union officers to nullify ad-
journment of a meeting and to permit a vote on a motion to suspend a business agent pend-
ing his trial on charges of bribery and extortion was upheld in McFarland v. Building Ma-
terial Teamsters Local No. 282, 45 L.R.R.M. 2544 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
4SIn Johnson v. Local 58, IBEW, 45 L.R.R.M. 2685 (E.D.Mich. 1960), a motion to dis-
miss was denied where plaintiff members sought injunction against threats and intimidation
by a local union and its officers interfering with their right to assemble and petition for a
charter from their international union.
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member to bring suit in court, to institute proceedings before an ad-
ministrative agency, to appear as a witness in administrative, judicial,
or legislative proceedings, to petition any legislature, or to communi-
cate with any legislator. But a member may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures (not exceeding a four-month lapse of
time) within the union before instituting legal or administrative pro-
ceedings against the union or the officers. An employer or employer
association may not finance, encourage or participate in such pro-
ceedings except as a party.
Section 101 (a) (5) protects a union member from discipline (fine,
suspension, expulsion) unless he "has been (A) served with written
specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense;
(C) afforded a full and fair hearing." Excepted from this procedure
is discipline imposed for nonpayment of dues.
Civil enforcement of the rights declared in Title I is provided for
in section 102. Suit may be brought in a federal district court "for
such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate."4 Under
section 105 all unions are under a duty to inform their members con-
cerning the provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
Under section 104 a local union must forward to a requesting em-
ployee a copy of any collective bargaining agreement that affects
him. In the case of a labor organization other than a local union,
when a collective bargaining contract is negotiated, a copy of it must
be forwarded to any unit which has members affected by the con-
tract. The secretary or "corresponding principal officer" of each labor
organization must maintain at its main office copies of collective bar-
gaining agreements negotiated or received by it. Employees affected
by the agreements have a right to inspect them.
B. Title II: Reporting by Unions, Their Officers, and
Employees, and Employers
Section 201 (d) of the new act repeals section 9 (f), (g) and (h)
of the NLRA. This means that non-communist affidavits are a thing
of the past. However, new and more extensive reporting requirements
have been enacted. Under the Taft-Hartley Act compliance with
section 9 (f), (g) and (h) was necessary only if a union wished to
make use of NLRB procedures. Now compliance with reporting re-
46 But Title I has no application to a suit by a business agent against his union for
wrongful discharge. Strauss v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 179 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.Pa.
1959). Title I deals with relations between unions and their members, not relations between
unions and their employees.
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quirements is not a condition precedent to using Board procedures
but is commanded generally.
Section 201 (a) declares that every labor organization "shall adopt
a constitution and bylaws and shall file a copy thereof" with the
Secretary of Labor. A report must also be filed containing the in-
formation formerly required by section 9(f). But additional details
are required concerning fees imposed for transferring members, issu-
ance of work permits and fees therefor, selection of representatives to
other bodies composed of labor organizations' representatives, disci-
pline of union officers and agents, and discipline of union members.
Section 201 (b) requires the filing of annual financial reports giv-
ing much the same information formerly required by section 9 (f).
More details must be supplied concerning disbursements, particularly
those to officers and employees either as compensation or as loans.
Direct and indirect loans to business enterprises must be reported.
At the time that the annual financial report is made, changes in the
information supplied under section 201 (a) must be reported.
Labor organizations must make available to their members all the
information supplied in the reports filed under Title II. Section
201 (c) makes it a duty of a union to permit its members "for just
cause to examine any books, records, and accounts necessary to verify
[a] report." This duty is enforceable in both state and federal
courts.
Section 202 (a) requires annual reports by union officers and em-
ployees (other than those performing exclusively clerical or custodial
services) concerning financial transactions that may conflict with the
loyalty they owe to members. The report must list stocks, securities,
and other interests which an officer or employee or members of his
immediate family have in an employer whose employees his union
represents. Any income derived from such an employer (except wag-
es or salary) must be reported. Transactions in which the officer or
employee or members of his immediate family have engaged with the
employer involving stocks, securities or loans must be reported. In-
formation must be given as to stocks, securities, and interests (includ-
ing income received) in any business that buys from, sells or lends
to, or has other dealings with the employer. Similar information must
be given as to stocks, securities, and interests in any business that
buys from, sells or lends to, or otherwise deals with the union. Report
must be made of any business transaction between a union officer or
employee or member of his immediate family and an employer whose
employees are represented by the union (except payment of wages
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and salaries and bona fide purchases and sales of goods and services).
Finally, any payment of money or thing of value by an employer or
labor consultant must be reported. Section 202(b) makes section
202 (a) inapplicable to "bona fide investments in securities traded on
a securities exchange registered as a national securities exchange."
Section 203 (a) requires employers to report annually all payments,
loans, and promises therefor made to employees, unions, and union
officers and representatives, except payments of the kind referred to
in section 302 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as
amended (wages, checkoff of dues, payment of judgment or arbitra-
tion award, etc.). Report must be made of any payment to a group
of employees or committee for the purpose of causing them to influ-
ence other employees in exercising the rights to organize and to bar-
gain collectively, unless such payment was "contemporaneously or
previously disclosed to such other employees." The same must be
done as to any expenditure an object of which is to interfere with
employees' rights to organize and to bargain collectively, or to obtain
information as to union activities on the part of the employees in con-
nection with a labor dispute. Report must be made of any agreement
(and payment pursuant thereto) by which a labor relations consul-
tant or organization undertakes to interfere with employees' rights to
organize and to bargain collectively, or to obtain information con-
cerning union activities by the employees in connection with a labor
dispute. Under section 203 (b) labor relations consultants must re-
port agreements of this type within 30 days after they are entered
into. A "detailed statement of the terms and conditions" of each
"agreement or arrangement" must be made. A labor relations consul-
tant making an agreement or arrangement which must be reported
is required to file an annual statement of his receipts from employers
,ton account of labor relations advice or services, designating the
sources thereof," and his disbursements in connection with the serv-
ices. Excepted from the reporting requirement is an agreement be-
tween an employer and labor relations consultant by which the latter
undertakes to obtain information "for use solely in conjunction with
an administrative or arbitral proceeding or a criminal or civil judicial
proceeding."
Section 203 (c) excepts from the previous subsections agreements
whereby a person undertakes to advise an employer or to represent
him before a court, administrative agency or arbitration tribunal or
in collective bargaining. Section 203 (e) excepts from the reporting
requirements the employment contracts of regular officers, supervis-
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ors, and employees of an employer. Section 204 extends an exception
to attorneys with respect to "any information which was lawfully
communicated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course
of a legitimate attorney-client relationship."
The reports and documents filed with the Secretary of Labor are
made public information by section 205. Inspection and examination
are to be allowed under reasonable regulations. On payment of a
charge based upon cost of the service, the Secretary is directed to fur-
nish copies of reports and documents which have been filed. No
charge is made to state agencies. Persons subject to Title II are under
a duty to maintain records and basic data sufficient for verification
of the reports filed. The records and data must be kept for five years
after the filing of the papers based on them.
Section 209 prescribes criminal penalties ($10,000 fine or one year's
imprisonment or both) for willful violation of Title II, for falsify-
ing or withholding material facts in reports, or for falsifying, con-
cealing or destroying records. Under section 210 the Secretary of
Labor may bring a civil suit for appropriate relief whenever it ap-
pears that a person has violated or is about to violate the provisions of
Title II.
C. Title III: Trusteeships
Section 301 requires every labor organization which has or assumes
trusteeship over a subordinate organization (usually a local union)
to file a report with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days. There-
after reports must be filed at semi-annual intervals. Reasons must be
stated for the trusteeship and "the nature and extent of participation
by the membership of the subordinate organization in the selection
of delegates to represent such organization in regular or special con-
ventions or other policy-determining bodies and in the election of
officers of the labor organization which has assumed trusteeship over
such subordinate organization." A "full and complete account of the
financial condition of the subordinate organization" as of the time
trusteeship was imposed must be given. The trustee organization has
the responsibility for filing reports under section 201 (b) in behalf
of the subordinate organization. Falsification or concealment of ma-
terial facts and records, as well as other willful violation of section
301, is punishable by fine and imprisonment.
Substantive law concerning trusteeships is declared in section 302:
Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor organiza-
tion over a subordinate body only in accordance with the constitution
and bylaws of the organization which has assumed trusteeship over the
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subordinate body and for the purpose of correcting corruption or
financial malpractice, assuring the performance of collective bargaining
agreements or other duties of a bargaining representative, restoring
democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects
of such labor organization.
Under section 303 it is unlawful during a period of trusteeship to
count votes of delegates of the subordinate union in any convention
or election of officers of the trustee organization "unless the delegates
have been chosen by secret ballot in an election in which all members
in good standing of such subordinate body were eligible to partici-
pate." It is also unlawful to transfer to the trustee organization "cur-
rent receipts or other funds of the subordinate body except the nor-
mal per capita tax and assessments payable by subordinate bodies not
in trusteeship." Violation of the section is punishable by fine and im-
prisonment.
Section 304 creates a procedure whereby a trusteeship may be chal-
lenged. The subordinate organization or a union member may file a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor. If he finds probable cause
that section 302 or 303 has been violated, he may bring suit in a fed-
eral district court for appropriate relief (including injunction). The
identity of the complaintant need not be disclosed. Alternatively,
a union member or a subordinate organization may bring suit in fed-
eral district court for violation of section 302 or 303. 47 Section 306
states that rights and remedies provided for in Title III are in addition
to other rights and remedies at law or in equity. But when the Secre-
tary sues, "the jurisdiction of the district court . . . shall be exclusive
and the final judgment shall be res judicata."
Section 304 (c) raises a presumption that a trusteeship established
pursuant to procedural requirements of the trustee's constitution and
bylaws and authorized after a fair hearing continues valid for 18
months. Attack cannot be made "except upon clear and convincing
proof that the trusteeship was not established or maintained in good
faith for a purpose allowable under section 302." After 18 months
the trusteeship is presumed invalid and its discontinuance will be
decreed unless the trustee shows "by clear and convincing proof that
the continuation of the trusteeship is necessary for a purpose allow-
able under section 302."
D. Title IV: Elections
Detailed regulations are made of election processes within unions.
47 But in Flaherty v. McDonald, 45 L.R.R.M. 2690 (S.D.Cal. 1960), a suit for removal
of a trusteeship was dismissed on the ground that the Secretary of Labor had not acted or
refused to act.
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The officers of a national or international labor organization must be
elected not less than once every five years by secret ballot of the mem-
bers or at a convention of delegates chosen by secret ballot. Local or-
ganizations must elect their officers not less than once every three
years by secret ballot of the members. Officers of intermediate bodies,
such as system boards, joint boards, and joint councils, must be elect-
ed not less than once every four years by secret ballot of the members
or by representatives of the members who have been elected by se-
cret ballot. These restrictions do not apply to officers of a federation
of national or international organizations.
Under section 401 (c) national, international, and local labor or-
ganizations are under a duty to comply with reasonable requests of
candidates to distribute campaign literature to union members at their
(the candidates') expense. The duty is enforceable by suit of a bona
fide candidate in federal district court. The labor organization may
not discriminate in favor of or against a candidate with respect to
the use of lists of members. If it distributes campaign literature on
behalf of any candidate, "similar distribution at the request of any
other bona fide candidate shall be made by such labor organization
and its officers, with equal treatment as to the expense of such distri-
bution." A bona fide candidate has a right, once within 30 days prior
to the election in which he is a candidate, to inspect a list of names
and addresses of all members of the union who are subject to union
shop agreements. "Adequate safeguards to insure a fair election shall
be provided, including the right of any candidate to have an observer
at the polls and at the counting of the ballots."
Section 401 (e) enumerates rights and safeguards in connection
with secret elections. Reasonable opportunity must be allowed for the
nomination of candidates, and every member in good standing is eli-
gible to be a candidate (subject to restrictions in Title V and to rea-
sonable qualifications uniformly imposed). All members have the
right to vote and to support candidates of their choice without being
subject to penalties or reprisals. Not less than 15 days prior to an elec-
tion, notice must be mailed to each member. One vote is permitted to
each member in good standing. If his dues have been deducted pur-
suant to a checkoff agreement, he cannot be denied the right to vote
or to be a candidate for office "by reason of alleged delay or default
in the payment of dues." Votes cast by members of different local
organizations must be counted, and the results published, separately.
Ballots and records pertaining to an election must be preserved for
a year. Likewise, the credentials of delegates at a convention at which
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officers are elected and all minutes and records pertaining to the elec-
tion must be preserved for a year. Neither union nor employer funds
may be used to promote the candidacy of any person in an election.
But union monies may be utilized for notices, factual statements of
issues not involving candidates, and other expenses necessary for
holding an election.
Occasionally the constitution or bylaws of a union do not provide
for the removal of an elected officer who has been guilty of serious
misconduct. If the Secretary of Labor finds this state of affairs to
exist, section 401 (h) provides a remedy. The officer may be removed,
"for cause shown and after notice and hearing, by the members in
good standing voting in a secret ballot conducted by the officers of
such labor organization ......
Section 402 creates a procedure for enforcing the requirements of
section 401. A member of a union may file a complaint with the Sec-
retary of Labor alleging violation of the section or of the constitution
or bylaws of the union. This can be done only after exhausting reme-
dies within the union or invoking available remedies without ob-
taining a final decision within three calendar months. The complaint
must be filed within a calendar month after exhaustion of union re-
medies or the passing of three months. While the complaint is pend-
ing before the Secretary, the challenged election is presumed valid
and the affairs of the union are conducted by the elected officers. If
the Secretary finds probable cause that a violation of Title IV has
occurred, he is under a duty to bring a civil suit in a federal district
court within 60 days after he received the complaint. In the action
the court may set aside an invalid election, direct the conduct of an
election, or direct a hearing and vote upon the removal of an officer.
The court has power to make orders deemed proper to preserve the
union's assets.
Section 402 (c) enlarges upon the remedy available when a court
finds upon a preponderance of evidence that an election has not been
held within the prescribed time limits or that a violation of section
401 may have affected the outcome of an election. The court may
declare the election, if any, void and direct the conduct of a new
election under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor. On certifi-
cation by the Secretary, persons elected are declared by the court to
be officers of the union. If the action is for the removal of an officer,
the Secretary certifies the result of the vote and a court decree is en-
tered accordingly. Section 403 preserves rights and remedies under
union constitutions and bylaws before an election is held; but the
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"remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already
conducted shall be exclusive."
E. Title V: Fiduciary Responsibility of Union Officers
Section 501 (a) declares that union officers and representatives "oc-
cupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its mem-
bers as a group." Therefore, it is the duty of each officer and repre-
sentative to hold union funds and property "solely for the benefit of
the organization and its members," to manage and expend them in
accordance with union laws, "to refrain from dealing with such or-
ganization as an adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party in any
matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any
pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of
such organization," and to account for any profit received in con-
nection with transactions conducted by him on behalf of the union.
A general exculpatory provision in a union constitution (or bylaws)
or a general exculpatory resolution by a governing body purporting
to relieve an officer or agent of liability for breach of the duties de-
clared in the section is void.
Under section 501 (b) a union member may sue an officer or agent
for violation of the duties declared in section 501 (a) where the union
or its governing board or officers fail to do so after request and with-
in a reasonable time. The suit is brought in behalf of the union and
may be instituted in a federal or state court. Damages may be recov-
ered, and an accounting and other relief may be had. "No such pro-
ceeding shall be brought except upon leave of the court obtained
upon verified application and for good cause shown, which applica-
tion may be made ex parte." A reasonable part of the recovery may
be allotted to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting the suit and to com-
pensate plaintiff for expenses incurred. Section 501 (c) provides for
criminal penalties ($10,000 fine or five years' imprisonment or both)
where an officer or agent embezzles or converts union assets to his
own use or to the use of another.
Section 502 imposes bonding requirements on officers'and agents
who handle union funds and other property. Excepted are unions
with property and annual receipts of $5000 or less. A bond is fixed
at 10 per cent of the funds handled during the past fiscal year, but
in no case more than $500,000. The bond must be "individual or
schedule in form, and shall have a corporate surety company as
surety theron." A person who does not secure a proper bond is not
permitted to exercise custody or control over union funds or over a
trust in which the union has an interest. No bond may be placed
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through an agent or with a broker in which a labor organization or
any officer or agent has an interest. Violation of the section is punish-
able by fine and imprisonment.
Section 503 (a) prohibits loans to union officers or agents which
total in excess of $2000. Section 503(b) prohibits payment by a
union of any fine imposed upon an officer or agent. Violation of
these prohibitions is made a crime in section 503 (c).
Section 504 prohibits certain persons from serving as union
officers or agents, as labor relations consultants, or as labor relations
representatives of employer associations. Included are persons who
are or have been members of the Communist Party, who have been
convicted of enumerated felonies, or who have been convicted of
violation of Titles II or III of the new act. But this ban continues
for only five years after a person has terminated his membership in
the Communist Party or for five years after the end of his imprison-
ment (five years after conviction if no imprisonment is suffered).
The five-year period in the case of a felon may be shortened if his
citizenship rights, having been revoked as a result of the conviction,
are fully restored; or if the Board of Parole of the United States
Department of Justice "determines that such person's service . . .
[as a union officer or agent, labor consultant, or labor relations re-
presentative for an employers' association] would not be contrary
to the purposes of this Act." Violation of the section is punishable
by fine and imprisonment.
Section 505 amends section 302 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act, 1947. The prohibitions of the old act are retained and
expanded. It is unlawful for an employer, employer association, labor
relations consultant, or other person acting in the interest of an
employer to pay or lend money or other thing of value to any repre-
sentative of the employees or to a union which represent or seeks to
represent the employees. It is unlawful to pay or lend money or other
thing of value to a group of employees to cause them to influence oth-
er employees in the exercise of their rights to organize and bargain
collectively. The same acts are unlawful where a union or its officer or
agent is the recipient of the money or thing of value and the purpose
is to influence its or his actions and decisions as a representative of the
employees. It is also unlawful for a person to receive what employers
and their representatives are prohibited to pay or lend.
Section 302 (c) lists exceptions to the prohibitions of the preceding
subsections: wages, sales and purchases of articles at the prevailing
market prices in the regular course of business, checkoff of dues,
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monies paid to a trust fund established for the benefit of the em-
ployees and their families, and payments made in satisfaction of
judgments, arbitral awards and other bona fide claims. Other ex-
ceptions are payments made to employees "whose established duties
include acting openly for such employer in matters of labor relations
or personnel administration;" and payments to a trust fund estab-
lished by a union "for the purpose of pooled vacation, holiday,
severance or similar benefits, or defraying costs of apprenticeship
or other training programs."
F. Title VI: Miscellaneous Provisions
Section 601 bestows investigatory powers on the Secretary of
Labor. Section 602 prohibits "extortionate picketing"-picketing
carried on as a part of a plan for "the personal profit or enrichment
of any individual" by obtaining money or any thing of value from
an employer. Under section 609 it is unlawful for a union or its
agents to discipline a member for exercising any right to which he
is entitled under the new law. Force, violence or threat thereof to
coerce a union member and to interfere with the exercise of any
right under the act is made a crime in section 610.
III. CONCLUSION
The amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act in Title VII of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 have ef-
fected important changes in national labor relations law. Constitu-
tional questions as well as problems of construction have already
presented themselves. A great deal of litigation will have to be done
before answers can be given with assurance. It will be interesting
to know, to say the least, what the ultimate impacts will be of the
new provisions concerning secondary boycotts, "hot cargo" agree-
ments, and recognition picketing.
One may assert, however, that Titles I through VI of the new
act have greater significance than Title VII. Titles I through VI
are new legislation, declaring federal rights and duties which pre-
viously did not exist or existed only in an incomplete or uncertain
way. Title VII amends old legislation, and, while all of it is new
and important, it relates to familiar situations under the old acts.
Title I is a bill of rights for union members of extensive scope,
and Title II imposes reporting requirements calculated to expose im-
proper influences existing between employers and labor consultants
on one side and unions and officers on the other side. Title III sets
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up standards for trusteeships to the end that the funds of the
subordinate unions be preserved and that the rights of their members
be protected. Title IV is a detailed regulation of election and removal
procedures, and Title V spells out the fiduciary responsibilities of
union officers, besides imposing a bonding requirement for those
who handle union funds. All these rights and duties are enforceable
by administrative and judicial procedures.
Titles I through VI have a heavy substantive content, and most
of it places burdens and responsibilities on unions. Whether or not
one believes that disclosures of corruption and arbitrary practice
have justified their enactment, the legislation states principles with
which few or none will disagree. Unquestionably time will prove
that particular requirements and procedures of the titles are im-
practical, not worth the expense and effort they entail, or unwise.
Changes will then be made. But the indications are that Congress'
entry into the broad areas delineated by Titles I through VI is
permanent.
